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President Xi Jinping is a pivotal 
actor on the world stage and holds powerful 
positions within both the Chinese 
government and the Chinese Communist 
Party.  Assessing the president of the 
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is an 
increasingly important subject as the United 
States shifts more diplomatic and military 
resources to Pacific to implement their Pivot 
to Asian strategy.  The aim of this paper is 
to evaluate academic literature that focuses 
on Xi Jinping as the current leader of the 
People’s Republic of China.  That 
information will then be analyzed using 
techniques derived from literature on 
political leadership studies such as political 
psychology.  The literature from two schools 
of political leadership study will be applied 
to the presidency of Xi Jinping resulting in a 




Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission took over as the 
General Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in 
2012.  He was born in Beijing to Xi 
Zhongxuan, an original leader of the CCP 
during the time of Mao Zedong.  Xi Jinping 
was privileged to have a good education 
despite his youth working among peasants in 
lice-infested fields and living in a cave in the 
western provinces.  After being forced to 
leave Beijing, he worked his way into the 
CCP at an early age, always supporting the 
Communist Party and working hard as 
provincial secretary of both rural and urban 
centers in the Fujian province.  His 
upbringing and allegiance to the CCP may 
play a role in the style of his leadership.  
There are also environmental factors of 
politics at play, which may account for his 
actions during his presidency, as well as any 
future actions.  The weakening of the 
Chinese Communist Party, as well as 
regional and global power politics with 
Washington, Tokyo, Moscow, and 
Pyongyang, may be forcing Xi Jinping to act 
in ways he otherwise would not.  The 
relationship between Washington and 
Beijing is becoming increasingly significant 
in the 21st century as China grows into a 
peer competitor to the long established 
primacy of the United States.  Events such 
as the pro-Democracy protests in the Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong, 
disputes over the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku 
Islands), and an increasingly erratic North 
Korea have promoted increased cooperation 
and brinkmanship between the two powers.  
A lot is at stake, and the largest regional 
actor is being led by a man who should be 
assessed if the United States is to determine 
how to act and react to his actions, and 
defend its interests.  This begs the question: 
Is Xi Jinping leading China based on his 
own individual leadership style, or is he 
being affected by systemic or domestic 
pressures that are out of his control? 
 
Xi Jinping: The Individual 
 An individual’s background can 
predict a lot about his character, personality, 
and leadership style.  Growing up as a 
believer in the CCP, as well as being well 
educated, Xi steadily worked his way up the 
political hierarchy until the mid-1980s, 
where his career in the CCP reached a new 
level.  Garnaut (2012) explains that “when 
Xi describes himself as ‘always a son of the 
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Yellow Earth [Referring to agriculture 
around the Yangtze River],’ he was setting 
up his personal narrative as a leader, who 
has toiled with the masses, in contrast with 
increasingly corrupt governing elite.”  Xi 
was born in 1953 and was fortunate to move 
from Beijing to the western provinces as a 
child.  The Cultural Revolution rocked 
Beijing, and he was spared from taking part 
in the red terror.  Having experience in both 
rural and urban environments, as well as in 
different levels of government and 
bureaucracy, Xi Jinping “acquired a 
reputation as a realistic, efficient, and 
relaxed Party Secretary, conscious of the 
need for China to move towards a market 
economy” (Cabestan 2012).  Described as a 
modernizer, Cabestan (2012) analyzes Xi 
Jinping’s political motives, explaining how 
“he tried to improve and simplify the 
administrative machine ... [and] make the 
processes of selection and promotion of 
government cadres more transparent.”  
Moreover, Xi is simultaneously described as 
a realist in that he is conscious of 
environmental issues, needs to upgrade 
industry for the 21st Century.  He is also 
aware of conflicts between domestic leaders 
in business; he operates off of the slogan, 
‘coordination and balance.’  In sum, 
Cabestan (2012) profiles Xi Jinping as a 
conservative but flexible modernizer, 
assessing him as “pragmatic, a modernizer, 
and even reformist.”  On the contrary, 
Cabestan (2012) also assesses Xi to be “a 
cautious, orthodox leader, unwilling in his 
actions, style, and even more so in his 
private life to depart from the norm 
authorized by the Party and to expose 
himself to attacks by his detractors.”  Xi is a 
good organizer and coordinator.  He was 
able to put these traits into practice 
successfully in 2008 while in charge of the 
preparations for the Beijing Olympic 
Games.  
 Miller (2008) provides an assessment 
of the new Politburo, which includes Xi 
Jinping as leader of the Standing 
Committee.  The Politburo oversees the 
Communist Party of China and the power is 
consolidated in the Politburo Standing 
Committee (PBSC).  Miller states that “the 
new Politburo leadership attributes over the 
past two decades has increased…It is the 
best-educated leadership in PRC history, 
less thoroughly technocratic, and still starkly 
civilian in experience.” Xi leads the 
Politburo with advanced degrees in law and 
chemical engineering.  As Miller (2013) 
explains, one of the first things Xi did in 
office was downsize the nine member 
Politburo Standing Committee to seven 
members.  This may have been an effort to 
consolidate his power and isolate executive 
decision making from the rest of the CCP.  
Xi Jinping’s leadership style can be 
described as unilateral in the methods of his 
thinking, although he has to reconcile his 
aspirations with the reality posed by the 
structure of the Chinese government.  
 Xi Jinping is further attempting to 
change the agenda of Chinese grand 
strategy. Formerly, the Chinese grand 
strategy focused on economic development, 
while today Xi is more interested in 
fostering Chinese hegemony in the region.  
Chen (2014) suggests that “Xi seems to have 
shifted from [Deng Xiaoping’s] ‘keeping a 
low profile’ principle” of Chinese national 
strategy.  Chen (2014) goes on to explain, 
“what has been emphasized is the need to be 
active in foreign affairs because without this 
it would be impossible to realize the Chinese 
Dream and the great national rejuvenation 
which Xi has emphasized.”  The Chinese 
Dream describes a set of personal and 
national ideals in the People's Republic of 
China and the Communist Party of China.  It 
is used by journalists, government officials, 
and activists to describe the role of the 
individual in Chinese society as well as the 
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goals of the ‘Chinese nation.’  This is 
incredibly important because both the CCP, 
as well as the State Council, have strongly 
opposed the shift away from a focus on 
domestic economic development that has 
been used to foster the Chinese Dream.  
Chen (2014) argues that “also important is 
how Chinese leaders assess the international 
environment in the future.”  Assertive 
foreign policy behavior from Beijing and 
ultimately Xi Jinping will lead to them 
acting ambitiously based on the belief that 
China is still in a period of strategic 
opportunity and confidence.  This is 
evidence that Xi is acting against the 
political environment and leading based on 
personal goals and ambition.  
 Elizabeth Economy (2014) states that 
“Chinese President Xi Jinping has 
articulated a simple but powerful vision: the 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”  During 
a time of political weakness within the CCP, 
Economy (2014) states that “Xi has reacted 
to this sense of malaise with a power grab—
for himself, for the Communist Party, and 
for China.  Xi rejected the communist 
tradition of collective leadership, instead 
establishing himself as the paramount leader 
within a tightly centralized political system.”  
Domestically, Xi put forth economic 
reforms that would bolster the market while 
allowing the state to retain significant 
control.  He sought to elevate China by 
expanding trade and investment, creating 
new international institutions, and 
strengthening the military.  This is his 
vision, his agenda, and it goes against the 
policy of ‘lying low,’ which has been in 
place since the 1990s.  Economy (2014) 
argues that although “the roots of Xi’s 
foreign policy predate his presidency—he 
has replaced the decades-old mantra of the 
former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, ‘hide 
brightness, cherish obscurity,’ with a far 
more expansive and muscular foreign 
policy.”  Economy (2014) further states that 
“Xi’s nationalist rhetoric and assertive 
military posture pose a direct challenge to 
U.S. interests in the region and call for a 
vigorous response.”  This is a significant 
divergence from the CCP strategy of 
focusing on developing stable market 
relations within the region and with the 
United States.   
 Beyond foreign policy agenda, is the 
number one objective for the People’s 
Republic today, ‘the Chinese Dream.’  Bin 
He (2013) writes that “the China Dream as 
Xi Jinping puts it is the ‘great renaissance’ 
of the Chinese nation—Xi is trying to 
project the vision that China will be number 
one; China will be back on top and lead the 
world.”  Although the China Dream, or 
Chinese Dream, may seem like a reboot of 
Hu Jintao’s two 100-year plans, Xi has made 
it his own and is using it to solidify the 
CCPs position until at least the next decade.  
For Xi, the continuity of the Communist 
Party is a priority, especially now in a time 
of waning influence caused by widespread 
corruption.  He (2013) argues that 
“understanding Xi’s dream is of great 
importance—it may provide some clue as to 
which direction Xi will lead China.”   It is 
evident today that Xi favors an assertive 
China that is active in international affairs; 
Xi is doing as much as he can to push his 
agenda forward without being put into the 
light of the CCP.  Essentially, Xi is acting 
on his plans while being conservative 
enough as to not draw too much attention 
from the Communist establishment.  
  
Individual Style Analysis 
 The study of individual leadership 
styles, characteristics, and personality is 
difficult to execute without quantifiable 
measurements, but it can be easier by 
comparing specific cases.   Most heads of 
government are privileged with the duty to 
command their nation on the international 
stage as the principal foreign affairs officer.  
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The President of the United States (POTUS) 
is the Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces; the President of China, Xi Jinping is 
the Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission as well as the head of 
government.  Xi, like the POTUS, has the 
ability to control military forces and interact 
with other international actors as the 
principal statesman; both chief military 
commander and chief diplomat.  Observing 
Xi Jinping’s leadership in relation to 
Chinese foreign affairs is therefore a 
methodologically sound way to assess his 
presidency, because compared to domestic 
affairs Xi has more control over decision 
making.  
 In order to truly understand Xi 
Jinping as a leader, it is important to assess 
him as an individual.  According to David 
Winter (2013), “[O]ne of the central axioms 
of political psychology is that political 
structures and actions are shaped and 
channeled by people’s personalities—that is, 
by their individually patterned integration of 
processes of perception, memory, judgment, 
goal-seeking, and emotional expression and 
regulation.”  This is interesting because it 
suggests that presidential personality can 
shape the outcomes of very important 
political structures.  
Dyson and Preston state that 
“individual complexity has been linked to 
how attentive or sensitive individuals are to 
information from their surrounding political 
or policy environments and to the extent to 
which they require information from when 
making decisions” (2006, 267).  
Interestingly, individual complexity has 
been linked to a leader’s style of decision 
making, use of advisors, and the way they 
process information within their decision 
groups.  The indicator of a true presidential 
style and trait emerges during a time of 
national emergency.  In particular, when 
foreign policy decisions must be made 
immediately, the president must use and in 
turn reveal his true character, leadership 
style, and cognitive ability.  Xi Jinping is a 
hard core Chinese Communist with a life 
expressed by hard work and self-reliance.  
From the literature on Xi as an individual, it 
is clear that he is cautious but ambitious, 
coordinated and balanced.  Xi is not one to 
publically ‘toe the party line’ and privately 
follow the status quo.  Even though he wants 
the same ends as the Central Committee, a 
strong China, he wants to achieve those ends 
by a different set of means.  His agenda, the 
China Dream, is an excellent example.  
Although taken from his processor Hu 
Jintao, as He (2013) states, Xi has made it 
his own, with his own agenda.  Moreover, 
Xi has exhibited assertiveness as well as 
high achievement striving not only by way 
of his rise in the political sphere but when he 
was nominated president by the Politburo he 
changed the institution, the Politburo 
Standing Committee, from nine members to 
seven.  
 
Xi Jinping: Leading the Political 
Behemoth 
 China’s government and communist 
party structure is complex, corrupt, and 
massive. The CCP alone has over 80 million 
members as staff, bureaucrats, or in 
leadership positions.  The State Council, the 
Politburo (Political Bureau), and the Central 
Military Commission (CMC) exhibit 
immense clout over national decision-
making and implementation.  Cheng (2013) 
argues that “China’s ‘economy-first’ 
mentality toward [Northeast Asia] remains 
unchanged from the previous administration 
of [Hu Jintao]—This means that vigorous 
growth during Xi’s first term will be 
critical.”  Cheng (2013) looks back at the Hu 
Jintao’s administration and how a focus on 
regional stability and economic growth was 
in line with China’s grand strategy.  In the 
PRC, development of the market comes first 
and Xi is going to have to reconcile with 
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that reality. Cheng (2013) cites a “split” 
within China’s government:  
 
on one hand…China naturally 
nurtures ambitions to return to its 
former primacy and to be accepted 
as a regional leader China needs to 
pass the tests of regional leadership, 
including the denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula—On the other 
hand…China still wants North 
Korea’s cooperation as a bulwark 
against a U.S. aligned movement on 
its periphery. 
 
This poses a major challenge for Xi and his 
government. As he attempts to push forth his 
own agenda, the more real bulwark may be 
the CCP.  
 In addition to this, Xi is faced with 
increasing opposition to implement his more 
assertive agenda of regional primacy.  
Christensen (2011) argues that “Beijing’s 
new, more truculent posture is rooted in an 
exaggerated sense of China’s rise in global 
power and serious domestic political 
insecurity—As a result, Chinese 
policymakers are hypersensitive to 
nationalist criticism at home and more rigid, 
at times even arrogant, in response to 
perceived challenges abroad.”  Xi must 
balance both domestic and international 
pressures while pursuing his agenda.  It is 
becoming increasingly difficult to pursue the 
modernization of the Peoples Liberation 
Army (PLA) and regional hegemony if there 
is still support for a focus on economic 
development and neutral relations with the 
international community.  Although Xi 
Jinping is described as a modernizer, 
Christensen (2011) explains that “driven by 
the fear of a precipitous collapse of a 
neighboring communist regime and the 
reduction of Chinese influence on the 
Korean Peninsula, Beijing has fallen back 
on long-held conservative Communist Party 
foreign policy principles in backing North 
Korea.”  Moreover, a weakening of the CCP 
in recent years has led to increased zeal from 
China’s top leaders.  This has enabled Xi to 
clean up the CCP and pursue an effective 
anti-corruption campaign that has brought 
down several high-ranking CCP officers, 
both civilian and military, however there is 
increased pressure on Xi himself.   
 Additionally, Xi’s vision for the 
modernization of the PLA may be difficult 
to attain. Garnaut (2013) uses a quote by 
Mao Zedong to argue his point: “the 
people’s army is not merely an organ for 
fighting; it is an organ for the political 
advancement of the party.”  He claims that 
Mao’s statement has been confirmed by all 
of his successors and that “Xi may be able to 
build a military that either is modern and 
capable or loyal and political—But many in 
China now believe he can’t have both” 
(Garnaut 2013).  Xi has to pursue his agenda 
against the status quo and although it seems 
as if he is doing this successfully, there are 
forces within the CCP acting against him.  
The largest problems are dissent within the 
Politburo against the shift in the PLA, as 
well as the more urgent problem of 
unchecked corruption throughout the entire 
military apparatus. 
 
Assessment of the Working Environment 
 The Chinese government is a 
complex mass of positions that enable 
centralized control and communal decision 
making.  The Chinese Communist Party 
consists of the National Party Congress of 
the Chinese Communist Party that elects the 
200 or so members of the Central 
Committee.  The Central Committee then 
selects the 25 member Politburo that in turn 
‘elects’ the nine [now seven] members of 
the Politburo Standing Committee.  Xi 
Jinping is the General Secretary of the Party, 
the Head of State, and the Chairman of the 
Central Military Commission.  The 
5
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Politburo oversees the Secretariat which in 
turn oversees the implementation of the 
Politburo Standing Committee’s agenda.  
The Government of the Peoples Republic of 
China is separate but equal to the CCP, and 
consists of the National People’s Congress 
(NPC).  The NPC is the unicameral 
legislature that oversees the State Council 
which is the civil service equivalent to the 
Politburo, and has equal domestic clout 
albeit they work together.  To reiterate, 
China’s complex and massive civil service 
system, as well as the separate and equally 
massive and complex Communist Party 
system, greatly hinders the effectiveness of 
any single person in power.  
 To put this into methodological 
perspective, pluralist theorists such as 
Theodore Lowi (1985), and rational choice 
theorists such as Terry Moe (1993) contend 
that the modern presidency “is so 
institutionalized, and to such a degree a 
prisoner of excessive public expectations 
and other external constraints, that the 
personality of the occupant matters 
relatively little in terms of political 
outcomes.”  A central criticism from both 
pluralists and rational choice theorists is that 
“personality theory is a quagmire of illusive 
concepts, intuition, and subjective 
frameworks” (George 1974; Greenstein 
1969).  If the Chinese presidency is any 
indicator of institutionalized leadership, the 
personal character and ambitions of Xi 
Jinping matter little to none in the grand 
scope of the CCP.  
 Research on political leadership and 
decision making suggests that leaders vary 
systematically in their orientations toward 
constraints.  The article by Johnathan Keller 
develops an integrative theoretical 
framework that explicitly incorporates these 
insights and applies them to the domain of 
crisis decision making.  “Leaders’ scores on 
key characteristics (based on at-a-distance 
assessment methods) are used to identify 
their expected inclination to challenge or 
respect domestic constraints” (Keller 2005, 
837).  Interestingly, the logic behind this 
argument lies in the context of the 
individual’s presidency, administration, etc.  
“Domestic constraints that presumably 
excerpt either a pacifying or incendiary 
influence on decision makers include public 
opinion, power-sharing institutional 
arrangements, institutionalized opposition, 
and norms involving dispute resolution” 
(Keller 2005, 837).  Normalized models 
assume that these external constraints are 
extremely powerful and are unlikely to be 
circumvented by decision makers.  
Although, research also suggests that the 
assumed causal mechanisms underlying the 
constraints suggests that “most of these are 
appropriately viewed as potential constraints 
vis-à-vis the immediate decision making 
process” (Keller 2005, 837).  Moreover, 
differentiation in leadership styles will allow 
decision makers to react and act differently 
within varied domestic political constraints.  
The grand hypothesis that Keller puts forth 
is that “one of the defining attributes of 
constraint challengers is their reliance upon 
internal belief, principals, and perceptions as 
a guide to decision making” (2005, 843).  It 
is difficult to believe otherwise that this is 
not suggesting that external factors play a 
role in decision making processes of leaders.  
The biggest constraint put on the CCP are 
domestic, nationalistic rhetoric and civil 
protest against corruption are putting a lot of 
pressure on the Chinese government.  
 Even in the area of international 
affairs, Xi Jinping is restricted by the other 
members of the Politburo who, as a 
collective, decide on the agenda of the CCP.  
China has a grand strategy that’s sole 
objective is Chinese primacy on the 
international stage, as well as domestic 
development of a market based economy.  
China dreams of being a global hegemon, an 
economic superpower, and to have the 
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China Dream.  The literature is clear about 
these aspirations, but it is also clear that Xi 
Jinping has a lot of pressure coming from 
Beijing. 
 
Personal Analysis: Individual versus 
Systemic Affect 
 Xi Jinping is one of the most 
powerful men on the earth as the President 
of China. He is the General Secretary of the 
Chinese Communist Party as well as the 
Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission.  Both institutions represent a 
large degree of clout, both domestically and 
internationally.  Xi is a determined leader, 
one who is doing what he can to make sure 
his agenda is implemented, and he is doing 
so in a way that he will not be stopped by 
the vast CCP political machine. Intelligent 
and driven, coordinated and balanced, Xi 
Jinping is leading.  On the other hand, Xi is 
restricted by a complex and redundant 
system of government that is collectively 
responsible for China’s future.  Both the 
Central Committee and the Politburo put 
immense institutional pressures on the 
presidency that may have great effect on any 
individual actions that Xi may otherwise 
make.  China has a reputation for being 
cautious and remaining neutral.  This may 
be attributed to these outside forces 
preventing Xi, or any other PRC leader for 
that matter, from being the statesman they 
want to be; they are preventing Xi from 




 There are inherent problems with 
literature of this kind.  First, Xi Jinping is a 
sitting president, and academic literature 
assessing his presidency is few and far 
between. Moreover, a lot of the literature 
originating out of China is censored or 
fabricated, so all analyses of Chinese 
sources were conducted cautiously.  The 
structure of Chinese politics is large, 
complex, and enigmatic.  Transparency and 
efficiency are not a strong suit for the 
government or the party, therefore 
information regarding the two may be 
distorted or fragmented.  Additionally, Xi 
Jinping is known to act in the shadows, 
meaning that he will do or say something 
that cannot be easily traced back to him.  
 Literature was vague and had to be 
assessed in depth; some authors did not 
write about Xi’s leadership directly, but 
wrote more directly on the challenges that 
he and the CPP are facing.  This information 
was difficult to propagate into a coherent 
review because the individual and the 
systemic effects in regards to leadership 
studies were hardly addressed directly.  The 
sources that were reviewed mostly used 
evidence derived from speculation or from 
Xi’s past before his presidency.  This 
information was useful to gain an idea of 
what might be happening in Beijing, but it is 
nothing compared to first-hand knowledge 
of Xi Jinping.  
 Research into the political 
psychology of presidents and the effect on 
foreign policy decision-making is as 
complex as it is divided.  Two distinct 
schools are constantly evolving and 
developing theories and hypotheses in order 
to understand how certain policy outcomes 
occur.  On one side of the argument, 
researchers believe the environment of the 
leader shapes policy, whether it is systemic, 
domestic, and/or the administration itself.  
On the other hand, researchers argue and 
develop methodologies to test the theory that 
individual presidential or leader personality 
and behavior drives policy outcomes.  Both 
sides have a substantial amount of quality 
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Conclusion 
 Xi Jinping is an ambitious leader.  
He is a modernizer and a reformer who is 
attempting to balance with a hard line 
communist party background.  Chinese 
politics are complex; on one hand great 
effort is made to maintain the CCP’s 
legitimacy, but on the other hand great effort 
is also put into developing a globally 
integrated market economy.  The size and 
scope of the Chinese government and party 
hinder the individual ability of Xi Jinping to 
act as he wishes, to be assertive and 
effective.  Xi is an intelligent person who 
has years of experience within the CCP, 
however and he knows how to play the 
system in order to get what he wants without 
being caught.  Xi Jinping is a dynamic 
leader; a leader who can be both a great 
reformer and also an old-school communist 
conservative.  Overall, there simply is not 
enough quantitative or qualitative data that 
is empirically accurate enough to connect 
claims of causation.  As for the external 
variables, without clear examples and an 
empirically significant section of cases to 
reinforce causal claims, the theories will 
never be able to transition into fact.  The 
hypothesis that systemic, domestic, or 
administrative variables can have effect on 
presidential decision-making is sound 
however, gathering and applying data is 
difficult and rarely is not qualitative in 
nature.  As for Xi Jinping, the CCP has 
attempted to hold the status quo, but it 
simply was not enough to contain their 
leader. Xi has cracked down on corruption, 
created the AIIB bank, acted aggressively in 
the South China Sea, and has expanded 
Chinese affairs into Africa.  Moreover, Xi 
has no desire to step down from his position; 
he has not made any attempt to prepare a 
successor and has made it obvious that he 
intends to remain leader of China well into 
the 2020s.  Due to this clear assertion of 
intention, it is more likely that Xi is running 
China than it is China that is running Xi.  
His individual leadership is greater than both 
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